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SPA, DD/S

14 November 1955

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AC/PFS/OTR

WKS

Training Study ☐ Area

REFERENCES:

- a. Training Study indicated above (TS/112750-A, Series C)
- b. Dispatch No. ☐-1121, subj: General - War Planning (TS/112750, Series C)
- c. Memo for SSA/DDS (Att: DTR), dtd 28 Oct. 55, from C/PFC, subject as above (TS/110292)
- d. Memo for OTR from Acting SPA, DD/S, dtd 2 Nov 55, subject as above (TS/110527)

1. With regard to the basic communication, the ☐ Area Training Study, OTR submits these comments:

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a. In paragraph 2.a. the term "clandestine/covert operations," is intended apparently to incorporate all wartime responsibilities of CIA in the theater. It is unsound from the standpoint of cover and security to combine all training efforts in support of these activities at one training installation or by one faculty. The training requirements for all CIA wartime activities will likely reveal a pattern of the training support which will be necessary to preserve the security of all training installations and their personnel.

b. Concerning paragraph 2.b. (1), the objectives stated for the training are sound and the levels of training outlined are appropriate. It should be pointed out, however, that current curricula at Headquarters and the ☐ training base have not been designed to train command and staff personnel for activities in a wartime situation. This will require a realignment of the training objectives and curricula, involving considerable lead time.

c. Regarding paragraph 3.a., it should be pointed out that CIA presently may not enroll military personnel in the military schools concerned primarily with the command and staff functions of the military services.

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d. The concept of the training command outlined in paragraph 3.b. (1), 6., and 7. and other paragraphs of the Tabs violates the primary responsibility of each country or other subordinate commander for local training activities. It is likely and perhaps desirable that some of the theater training activities be accomplished centrally, if distance, cover, and security factors permit. Training authority should be delegated to the country areas for local training activities. Standardization of training, technical guidance, and supervision, and the production of training aids can be accomplished by the [ ] training base operating in a staff relationship to the local training activities. OTR concurs with the FE Division in the concept of [ ] as a support installation to the theater training activities.

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e. In paragraph 3.b. (2), the concept of "Special Centralized Training" is unclear as to its meaning. The concept of group training for specialists in covert operations violates a basic principle of clandestine activity. Team training for certain activities is a proper concept.

f. With regard to the capacity of the [ ] training base recorded in paragraph 4., the conclusion reached is that this base can accommodate [ ] and "other requirements." The assumptions on which this conclusion was reached are not apparent in the study.

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g. OTR concurs that other training centers may be required as outlined in paragraph 5. If such is the case, responsibility for operation of the center should remain with the local country commander.

h. With regard to Tab B, paragraph 1.b. (5), the list of factors influencing training requirements might be expanded by the inclusion of the terms of reference submitted to [ ] (14 Sept. 1955).

2. These comments have been discussed with the FE Division, WPD/PPCS and Plans Staff/FI.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

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